Abstract
After Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown in 2003, the US decided to pursue its interests in the Middle East (ME) despite the interests of the ME countries. This strategic vision became evident in the strategy that guided US policy toward the region.
By examining the rationale behind these programs and their outcomes, we hope to examine the key components of US policy in the ME, particularly in Iraq. In order to further their objectives, the US imposed hegemony on the ME countries and subsequently on the global system during the occupation of Iraq, setting a new precedent for US relations with the region's nations.
The purpose of the study is to analyze America's strategy in the ME, especially the case of Iraq (the stage of the military invasion of Iraq in 2003), also the direct and indirect motives for the America's occupation in Iraq, and the America's strategy followed in Iraq after 2003, as for the decisions it took in Dissolving the Iraqi Army (DIA) and the Ba'ath Party (BP), the consequences of which were disastrous for the Iraqi state. Despite the US ability to change and amend strategies, it was unable to achieve the stated goals that it invoked when it invaded Iraq, and its military strategy ended in failure.
Main Subjects